

# Companion Animal Veterinary Software Guide

## Open Systems of Record: Industry Analogs for the Veterinary PIMS Interoperability Debate

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*Lessons from E-Commerce, CRM, Healthcare, and Fintech for Veterinary Software*

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### **TL;DR:**

- Across e-commerce (Shopify), CRM (Salesforce), healthcare (Epic), and fintech (Plaid/open banking), open API access has not displaced the system-of-record provider. The SOR function of governance, audit trails, and data integrity is durable; and the application layer is not the moat. In the examples we cite, SORs that opened their APIs created more ecosystem value (and value to them) than platforms that stayed closed.
- Customer consent, not vendor permission, is the governing mechanism in every mature framework. In healthcare, banking, and Shopify, app permissions use the same model: the customer authorizes specific access for specific purposes. No regulatory equivalent exists in veterinary medicine (and likely will not), but the human healthcare precedent establishes both the concept and the toolkit that follows.
- Restricting API access does not suppress innovation; it displaces it into less safe, less auditable channels. Plaid scraped bank data because banks refused APIs. Notion developers built unofficial workarounds. Voluntary interoperability commitments consistently produce poor results and stifle innovation.
- Veterinary PIMS sits where human healthcare was circa 2016. Today's norms still inhibit interoperability and downstream innovation. These case studies show why a faster move toward open, consent-based API access benefits PIMS vendors, third-party innovators, and clinics.

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## Executive Summary

Across every software industry, the pattern repeats: closed platforms restrict access, the market pushes back, and openness eventually becomes the winning strategy.

A dominant system of record (SOR) restricts third-party access to protect its competitive moat; innovators work around those restrictions or agitate for access; competitive pressure, regulatory mandate, or both, force openness; and the SOR provider almost invariably discovers that an open ecosystem creates more value than the closed platform ever could. Customer consent, not vendor permission, emerges as the governing mechanism in every mature framework.

Veterinary practice information management systems (PIMS) serve as a system of record for companion animal medicine: they hold patient histories, diagnostic data, appointment records, treatment plans, billing information, and client data. As AI-powered scribes, schedulers, receptionists, and clinical decision-support tools proliferate, the question of whether PIMS vendors will provide open, sanctioned API access to those tools on behalf of the clinics that own the data has become the defining interoperability question in veterinary software.

We discuss four case studies below,

1. Shopify in e-commerce;
2. Salesforce/Notion/Slack/Workday in productivity and CRM;
3. Epic electronic health record (EHR) in human healthcare; and
4. Plaid/open banking in fintech.

Each documents this same arc.

**Every analog yields the same conclusion: open API access, governed by customer consent, simultaneously benefits the system of record vendor, the innovator ecosystem, and the end customer.**

Restriction is almost always a temporary posture that ultimately fails. But the delayed opening imposes real costs on innovation, security, and trust.

## The Architecture of a System of Record

A system of record is the authoritative, canonical store of data for a defined domain: patient records in healthcare, financial account data in banking, customer relationship data in customer relationship management (CRM), order and product data in e-commerce. Systems of record derive their value from completeness, reliability, and the trust stakeholders place in their data governance.

The recurring fear of SOR incumbents is that opening their data through APIs will “commoditize” their platform, allowing competitors to replicate their functionality, extract their customers, or erode their pricing power. In the industries we review, that fear generally did not play out the way incumbents expected.

The SOR function is durable precisely because it is hard to replicate: audit trails, regulatory compliance, data integrity, and institutional trust are sticky in ways that application-layer features are not.

As some have observed, a platform reaches its most powerful form when the economic value of everybody that uses it exceeds the value of the company that creates it. Every SOR that has opened its API has moved closer to this definition. Every SOR that has remained closed has risked being defined as something less.

## Case Study 1: Shopify. Platform Economics as Competitive Strategy

### 1.1 The Problem Shopify Solved

When Tobi Lütke co-founded Shopify in 2006, the dominant e-commerce platforms were closed, monolithic, and hostile to developers. Lütke, himself a deeply technical founder who had built an initial store for his snowboard business on a proprietary platform, understood the constraints of closed systems firsthand. Legacy commerce systems like Magento required server management, custom development, and significant technical resources. They were powerful but inaccessible.

Shopify's founding insight was different: build a manageable, hosted core, then open the platform so third-party developers could build every specialized capability merchants might need. This was, explicitly, a platform strategy rather than a product strategy.

### 1.2 The API-First Decision

The early decision to develop an API that let third-party developers build apps and integrations was, according to Lütke, the critical inflection point. *Rather than trying to build every feature a merchant might need*, Shopify built the open surface area that allowed others to build those features. Lütke described the deliberate economics of this decision in conversation with Reid Hoffman on Masters of Scale:

*"What we did to get the platform off the ground is to basically leave all the economics for Shopify on the table and give it to the third-party app developers. It just started out, and to this day, is an incredibly valuable platform to build on for other people."*

*Tobi Lütke, CEO of Shopify, Masters of Scale, April 2023*

This was a conscious subsidy of the ecosystem: Shopify deliberately suppressed its own take rate on the app store to attract developers. In 2021, Shopify further cut its commission to 0% on the first \$1 million earned by developers annually.

*A Veterinary context:* this contrasts with the strategy of many PIMS vendors that are attempting to develop their own scribes, online calendar apps, and the like while excluding dedicated third-party players who focus exclusively on providing these applications.

### 1.3 The Results

The ecosystem flywheel worked precisely as designed. By 2023, there were over 8,000 apps in the Shopify App Store. Shopify paid out more than \$1 billion to developers in 2024 alone. App developers collectively earned over \$1.5 billion since the store's inception.

Ben Thompson, writing in *Stratechery*, identified Shopify as having definitively crossed what he calls the 'Bill Gates Line,' the threshold at which a platform creates more value for its ecosystem than it captures for itself. He noted: 'In 2018, Shopify made about a billion dollars [in revenue]. We estimate that you, our partners, made more than \$1.2 billion.' Thompson argued that this alignment of incentives is what makes platform economics self-reinforcing. Every referral partner, developer, theme designer, and logistics provider is simultaneously incentivized to compete with each other narrowly and to ensure that Shopify succeeds broadly.

### 1.4 The Competitive Displacement of Closed Alternatives

The contrast with Shopify's legacy competitors is instructive. Magento (now Adobe Commerce) required developer expertise, server management, and custom builds for integrations. It was technically capable but structurally closed. As Shopify's open ecosystem grew, Magento's market narrowed to enterprises with dedicated development teams.

Shopify has grown to power over 4 million businesses across 175 countries with FY2024 revenue of \$8.88 billion and transactions representing approximately 10% of all U.S. commerce. None of this growth displaced Shopify's core function as the system of record for merchant inventory, orders, and customer data. The open API enriched the core. On average, Shopify merchants install six apps to optimize their stores. Each app creates additional value that makes the underlying platform stickier, not more vulnerable.

### 1.5 The PIMS Analog

A PIMS vendor that opens its API to AI scribes, AI receptionists, diagnostic imaging tools, and care plan applications does not lose its system-of-record function. It gains ecosystem value, increases switching costs, and creates a potential revenue opportunity from marketplace participation. The app ecosystem becomes a retention mechanism, not a threat to the platform's moat.

## Case Study 2: Productivity and CRM Software. Salesforce, Notion, Slack, and Workday

### 2.1 Salesforce: The Proof Point for Platform Economics

Salesforce provides the most quantified and widely-cited proof point that open SOR platforms create compounding value. When Salesforce launched AppExchange in 2006, it made a deliberate bet that third-party developers building on top of its CRM would make the platform exponentially more valuable.

The IDC ‘Salesforce Economic Impact’ study (Doc. #US48214821, September 20, 2021) quantified this bet definitively:

*“Salesforce is driving immense growth for its partner ecosystem, which will make \$6.19 for every \$1 Salesforce makes by 2026.”*

*IDC White Paper, ‘The Salesforce Economic Impact,’ Doc. #US48214821 (Sept. 20, 2021)*

The AppExchange now hosts over 6,700 partner listings with more than 9 million installs. Ninety percent of the Fortune 500 and 91% of Salesforce customers rely on partner apps and expertise found on AppExchange. The average independent service vendor (“ISV”) on AppExchange generates \$5.3 million in annual revenue. Salesforce’s core value proposition, the system of record for customer relationships, is entirely intact. The ecosystem richness deepens the moat rather than threatening it.

Salesforce has made API-first architecture a stated platform principle: ‘The Salesforce Platform prioritizes a rich and coherent API portfolio that covers everything that can be done via Salesforce-native user interfaces.’

## 2.2 The Siebel Counterexample

Siebel Systems, the dominant CRM vendor before Salesforce, was the architectural opposite: a full-stack, on-premise system with 45% CRM market share in 2000 and a notoriously closed, integration-hostile architecture. Siebel dismissed Salesforce as a ‘toy CRM’ when Salesforce launched in 1999. It did not take the threat seriously.

Siebel did not lose primarily because Salesforce had better CRM functionality at launch. It lost because Salesforce’s platform openness and software as a service (SaaS) delivery model attracted developers and integrations that Siebel could not match. Today, Siebel holds just 1.4% market share in CRM platforms, while Salesforce leads with over 22%. The closed SOR posture became a competitive dead end.

## 2.3 Notion: Suppressed Demand and Displaced Innovation

Notion launched in 2016 without a public API. This frustrated developers and drove workarounds, including unofficial reverse-engineered APIs and browser extension hacks. The innovation demand existed regardless of official access. Restricting the API did not suppress that demand. Instead, it displaced it into *less safe, less auditable channels*.

When Notion released its official API on May 13, 2021, the announcement described the founding vision directly:

*“Every business and person should be able to tailor software to their own needs. This public beta is the first step towards a whole new set of building blocks to make that vision a reality.”*

*Notion Labs, Inc., API Launch Announcement, May 13, 2021 (developers.notion.com)*

Developer adoption was immediate. The official API enabled a wave of integration partners, including Zapier, Automate.io, and hundreds of direct integrations, that expanded the platform’s addressable use cases without threatening the core functionality.

## 2.4 Slack: Conversational Data as the New SOR

In late 2025, Salesforce announced a new Real-Time Search (RTS) API and Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Slack, giving developers secure, flexible, agent-ready access to conversational data. The rationale was explicit:

*“Conversational data is the gold of the agentic era, yet it’s been locked away in unstructured messages and chats, largely out of reach for employees, let alone applications.”*

*Slack, ‘How Slack’s new platform is fueling the agentic era,’ Slack Blog, 2025*

Leading AI companies, including OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Perplexity, and Notion, were among the first to build on these new capabilities. Slack’s pivot toward openness was a competitive imperative: developer-friendly access to SOR data is now a prerequisite for AI ecosystem participation.

## 2.5 Workday: Enterprise HCM Opens for Integration

Workday, the dominant cloud-based human capital management (HCM) and enterprise resource planning (ERP) system, offers both SOAP and REST APIs, with OAuth 2.0 authentication<sup>2</sup> governing third-party access to employee records, compensation data, and HR workflows. The Workday Marketplace hosts partner-built applications vetted for quality and compatibility. Workday Integration Cloud Connect enables organizations to extend their core HCM with pre-built connectors to payroll providers, benefits platforms, and analytics tools.

The model: Workday remains the canonical system of record for employee data. Third parties build on top. Access is governed by OAuth 2.0 customer consent. The SOR function is enhanced, not threatened, by ecosystem participation.

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<sup>2</sup> OAuth 2.0 (Open Authorization 2.0) is an open authorization framework that allows a user to grant a third-party application limited access to a protected resource (such as patient data or financial records) without sharing login credentials. The resource owner (the clinic, patient, or account holder) explicitly authorizes the scope and duration of access. The system of record issues a time-limited access token rather than exposing the underlying credentials. In human healthcare, OAuth 2.0 operates through the SMART on FHIR framework: SMART (Substitutable Medical Applications, Reusable Technologies) is the authorization layer, and FHIR (Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources) is the data standard developed by Health Level Seven International (HL7). Together they enable a patient or clinician to authorize a specific third-party application to access specific clinical data from an EHR for a defined period. The same OAuth 2.0 consent mechanism underpins the CFPB Section 1033 rule in financial services and Workday’s third-party integration architecture in enterprise HCM.

## Case Study 3: Human Healthcare. Regulatory Mandate as the Forcing Function

### 3.1 The Closest Analog to Veterinary PIMS

Human healthcare provides the structurally closest analog to the veterinary PIMS situation: a dominant SOR (the EHR), a fragmented innovator ecosystem, and a clinic-level customer caught between them. Epic Systems now commands 42.3% of the acute care hospital EHR market, up from 31% in 2020. The company manages more than 325 million patient records, representing roughly 90% of all U.S. residents. In 2024, Epic achieved its largest net gain in hospital market share on record, winning nearly 70% of all hospitals impacted by EHR purchasing decisions. Its revenue reached \$5.7 billion in 2024.

For much of its history, Epic built its market position partly through restrictive API practices. *EHR vendors including Epic, Cerner, and eClinicalWorks built proprietary systems with restrictive APIs and charged third parties for access through controlled developer programs.* ‘Information blocking’ was the accepted practice: clinics and patients had no practical ability to direct their own data to tools they preferred, and vendors treated API access *as a revenue line* and a retention mechanism simultaneously.

### 3.2 The Regulatory Response: 21st Century Cures Act and ONC Final Rule

The 21st Century Cures Act (2016) and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) Interoperability and Information Blocking Final Rule (effective June 30, 2020) changed the calculus decisively. The rule prohibited information blocking by EHR vendors, health systems, and health IT developers. It required certified EHRs to implement Health Level Seven (HL7) Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (FHIR) based APIs (specifically SMART on FHIR) at no additional charge and granted patients the right to direct their data to any third-party application of their choosing.

The rule was unambiguous:

*“The API certification criterion requires the use of the HL7 FHIR standard Release 4... [and] requires standardized API access for single patient and population services... at no cost.”*

*ONC Cures Act Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 25642 (May 1, 2020)*

Enforcement has accelerated. In February 2026, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officially moved from policy to active enforcement, with investigations into potential information blocking now underway. EHR vendors, health systems, and health information exchanges face civil monetary penalties of up to \$1,000,000 per violation. Healthcare providers found to have committed information blocking face reimbursement consequences under Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) programs.

### 3.3 The SMART on FHIR Consent Model

The technical architecture that emerged from these mandates is instructive for any industry contemplating API governance. SMART on FHIR uses OAuth 2.0: the patient (or clinician,

depending on scope) authorizes a specific third-party application to access specific data elements for a specific period. The EHR remains the system of record and the audit trail. The patient's consent is the operative unlock. No consent, no access.

Third-party app developers register with Epic through the App Orchard (now Epic App Market), which provides APIs, data models, sandboxes, and support. The App Orchard grew from 115 apps in early 2018 to nearly 200 apps by late 2019, and has continued to expand. The underlying principle: the EHR is open, access is governed by consent, and the marketplace creates ecosystem value for Epic.

### **3.4 Epic's Market Position: Openness Did Not Weaken the Incumbent**

The most important empirical observation from the healthcare case study is that Epic's move toward FHIR-based interoperability did not weaken its market position. Epic has actually accelerated its market share gains since the ONC rule took effect. KLAS Research analysts noted that the strength of vendor partnerships 'likely has contributed to Epic's continued gains with providers, particularly large hospitals.'

Openness, even when compelled, made the Epic ecosystem richer. Richer ecosystems attract larger health systems, which generate more revenue. The SOR function proved durable, exactly as the cross-industry pattern predicts.

### **3.5 The Veterinary Parallel**

The structural parallel to veterinary PIMS is nearly exact. When a PIMS vendor restricts API access to a clinic that wants to use a third-party AI scribe, AI receptionist, or clinical decision-support tool, that vendor is creating a situation that is functionally similar to information blocking (even without a direct veterinary regulatory analog). The clinic is the customer. The pet owner is ultimately impacted, and the clinic is accountable for care and compliance. The clinic's consent should be sufficient. No equivalent regulatory prohibition currently exists in veterinary medicine. This places the industry at a position analogous to human healthcare circa 2016.

As one PIMS observer quoted in the Companion Animal Veterinary Software white paper stated plainly: 'Some PIMS companies are stifling innovation and animal care in the veterinary industry by not opening their API sets. And even worse, selectively providing access to third parties.'

## **Case Study 4: Fintech and Open Banking. The Long Arc from Scraping to Sanctioned Access**

### **4.1 The Problem: Banks as Closed Systems of Record**

Financial institutions are the oldest and most structurally entrenched systems of record in commercial life. For much of the digital era, consumer financial data was effectively locked inside bank systems. Consumers technically owned their account data, but banks did not offer developer-friendly APIs for fintech apps to retrieve that data securely. The result was a

fragmented ecosystem in which financial innovation was constrained by infrastructure that incumbents had no incentive to open.

#### 4.2 Plaid and the Scraping Precedent

Plaid was founded in 2013 by Zach Perret and William Hockey to solve a specific problem: connecting consumer financial apps to bank account data in the absence of official APIs. Their solution was screen scraping, a method in which Plaid would log into bank accounts (with user permission) using user credentials, read the HTML of the bank's web interface, and extract relevant data. It was widely understood to be a bridge technology: necessary because banks would not provide APIs, but fragile, opaque, and security-compromised.

The scraping approach scaled rapidly. Plaid connected to more than 12,000 financial institutions and powered fintech applications including Venmo, Robinhood, Acorns, Betterment, Coinbase, and Cash App. Collectively, these connections represented more than 200 million bank accounts. As Andrei Cherny, CEO of Aspiration, put it:

*“They are a huge part of the infrastructure of all of fintech. The entire ecosystem of companies that have come along over the last five years, and begun building great financial services, all rely on Plaid’s infrastructure.”*

*Andrei Cherny, CEO, Aspiration, Fortune (June 2021)*

But the scraping model carried serious costs. In 2021, Plaid settled a \$58 million class-action lawsuit alleging that it had collected and used bank account credentials and financial data without adequate consumer consent. TD Bank separately sued Plaid for mimicking its login screen to capture user credentials, creating security and reputational exposure for both parties.

The critical observation: *restricting API access did not stop fintech innovation. It made the innovation less safe, less auditable, and more legally exposed for everyone, including the banks themselves.*

#### 4.3 EU PSD2: The Regulatory Mandate (2018)

The European Union's response was regulatory. The Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2), enacted in 2015 and implemented by 2018, mandated that banks provide open, standardized APIs to licensed third-party providers, with no charge for basic API access, provided the account holder consented. This created the open banking ecosystem: Plaid, TrueLayer, Yapily, Tink (acquired by Visa for \$2.2 billion), and hundreds of fintech applications built on top of bank infrastructure without requiring banks to build those applications themselves.

McKinsey's assessment of PSD2's competitive implications was direct: 'PSD2 represents a significant step toward commoditization in the EU banking sector,' while simultaneously identifying the strategic opportunity for banks that embraced the directive as platform players.

A December 2024 survey by Plaid found that 61% of financial institution executives already consider open banking a top priority, with banks increasingly leveraging fintech partners to build smarter products through revenue-sharing agreements.

#### 4.4 U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Section 1033 Rule (October 2024)

The U.S. followed a longer arc. Congress enacted Section 1033 of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, granting consumers the right to access and share their own financial data. The CFPB did not finalize implementing rules until October 22, 2024. The result was a gap of fourteen years between statutory authority and enforceable regulation. CFPB Director Rohit Chopra articulated the rule’s purpose:

*“With the right consumer protections in place, a shift toward open and decentralized banking can supercharge competition, improve financial products and services, and discourage junk fees.”*

*CFPB Director Rohit Chopra, CFPB Press Release, October 22, 2024*

The final rule requires financial institutions to make consumer financial data available to consumers and authorized third parties in an electronic form, at no charge. The consumer’s consent is the operative mechanism. Plaid has publicly advocated for this framework, submitting to the CFPB that ‘individual Americans, not institutions, must remain in control of their financial data. People should be able to access and share their data freely and securely, without tolls or barriers imposed by incumbents.’

#### 4.5 The Transition from Scraping to APIs: Better for Everyone

Banks ultimately concluded that offering APIs was preferable to credential sharing: APIs gave them visibility, control, and auditability over what data was being accessed. By late 2020, Plaid had publicly committed to migrating 75% of its data volumes to APIs, as opposed to screen scraping, by the end of 2021. Today, Plaid has 80% of its network on or committed to APIs.

The fintech ecosystem that banks initially feared would disintermediate them has instead become, for the most innovative banks, a distribution and partnership channel. Open banking infrastructure enables even small businesses to access sophisticated financial services that once required large institutional relationships. The SOR function, the bank’s role as the authoritative holder of account data, was never threatened. The application layer above it was democratized.

### Synthesizing Principles

The five principles documented across all four case studies are consistent, verifiable, and directly applicable to veterinary PIMS.

Principle	Finding	Cross-Industry Evidence
SOR function is durable	Open API access has never displaced the governance and	Epic grew market share after FHIR mandates; Salesforce

	record-keeping role of the SOR provider.	leads CRM despite AppExchange; banks remain the SOR for financial data.
The application layer is not the moat	Attempts to hold the application layer as a competitive moat drive restrictive API posture. In every case examined, this posture eventually fails.	Siebel lost 45% CRM market share; closed banks faced fintech routing around them via scraping.
Customer consent is the operative mechanism	Every mature framework uses a consent model in which the customer authorizes specific access for specific purposes.	SMART on FHIR OAuth 2.0; CFPB Section 1033; Shopify app install permissions; Slack RTS API.
Restriction displaces, not suppresses, innovation	Blocking official APIs does not eliminate demand; it pushes innovation into less safe, less auditable channels.	Plaid's screen-scraping origin; Notion's unofficial APIs; fintech credential sharing.
Regulatory action follows failed market mechanisms	Voluntary interoperability commitments consistently produce insufficient results; regulation sometimes follows.	ONC Final Rule (2020) after years of EHR voluntary commitments; CFPB 1033 (2024) fourteen years after Dodd-Frank.

## Implications for Veterinary PIMS

The veterinary industry is earlier in this arc than any of the four sectors profiled above. That positioning creates both risk and opportunity.

- **The human healthcare ‘information blocking’ concept is a useful lens here** (as an analogy, not a legal claim). When a PIMS vendor declines to provide a clinic with API access to its own data for a third-party tool the clinic has selected, that resembles the kinds of restrictions that human healthcare later defined as information blocking. No regulatory prohibition currently makes it actionable in veterinary medicine. The human healthcare precedent, however, establishes both the concept and the regulatory toolkit that eventually follows.
- **The consent model is the appropriate governing mechanism.** The clinic’s consent to a specific third party, for a specific purpose, for a specific data scope, is sufficient authorization. The PIMS vendor’s permission is not required beyond ensuring the technical connection is available. This is the model that SMART on FHIR, CFPB Section 1033, and Shopify’s app permission system all use.
- **The platform economics argument is quantifiable.** The Salesforce ecosystem generating \$6.19 per dollar of Salesforce revenue is a proof point that open SOR platforms create compounding value. *PIMS vendors who frame API access as a threat to their business model are operating on a misunderstanding of platform economics that Salesforce, Shopify, and the banking sector have already resolved empirically.*
- **The scraping dynamic is already occurring.** Third-party veterinary software vendors that cannot access PIMS data via official API are accessing it through less auditable

means. Opening official APIs improves security and auditability for PIMS vendors, not just for innovators. This is precisely the lesson that banks learned from the Plaid credential-sharing era.

- **The competitive pressure is accelerating.** As the Companion Animal Veterinary Software white paper authors wrote: “The future of the PIMS is not a hub-and-spoke model; it is a network of applications with AI coordinating between them. The most valuable node is still the PIMS and their databases, which function as systems of record. Therefore, these platforms have a trust and retention imperative (and a commercial incentive) to move toward secure, consent-based integration.”

## Conclusion

The arc documented in these four case studies is not just a prediction. It is a documented historical pattern, replicated across industries as different as consumer payments, enterprise CRM, e-commerce, and hospital EHR systems. Open API access, governed by customer consent, has proven to create measurable value for every participant in the ecosystem: the SOR vendor gains ecosystem stickiness and often direct revenue; third-party innovators gain a sanctioned, secure, auditable data path; and the end customer (the clinic, in veterinary medicine) gains access to the best available tools without being constrained by their PIMS vendor’s own product roadmap.

The consent principle is the governing norm. In every mature framework examined, the customer, not the SOR vendor, holds the key. The clinic’s consent should be sufficient to authorize any third party it chooses to access *its own operational data*. That principle is already established in human healthcare law, in EU and U.S. financial regulation, and in the design of every successful SaaS platform marketplace. Given the direction of adjacent industries and buyer expectations, veterinary medicine is likely to move this way over time.

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